Gulf States Brace for a Wider War as US and Israel Weigh New Strikes on Iran

Gulf Arab governments are openly warning that a new round of American and Israeli strikes on Iran could trigger a wider, more destructive regional war than the fighting that began earlier this year. Their message, delivered at a security conference in Bahrain at the weekend, was unusually direct: diplomacy, not another military campaign, is the way out, and time for that diplomacy may be running short.

The warnings matter because the Gulf states are not distant observers: their cities, airports, ports and oil facilities have already been hit in this year's fighting, according to regional reporting, and their economies depend on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. A second round would not be contained to Iran alone.

What Gulf officials said in Bahrain

The clearest statements came at the IISS Manama Dialogue in Bahrain. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates, told delegates that Gulf states found themselves drawn into a crisis they had worked hard diplomatically to avert. He said the region was clearly seeking a political off-ramp, and that military solutions would only complicate an already very complicated situation.

Egypt's foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, went further at the same forum, saying he was extremely worried about fresh hostilities. In his assessment, a second round would be more dangerous and more destructive than the first, and would lead nowhere. His advice was blunt: the region had to draw lessons from the past.

These are not governments that oppose pressure on Iran in principle. Gulf states have long wanted Iran's missile and nuclear programmes constrained. What they oppose, in public at least, is a specific method: another round of strikes. Analyst Mohammed al-Basha said he had not heard a single Gulf official or civilian support renewed strikes, even though most sensed a new round was imminent.

Why a second round is feared to be worse

The first phase of the war began on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel began bombing Iran, and a truce followed in early April. During that period, Iran fired missiles and drones at Gulf countries, striking sites that included oil facilities, airports and power plants, according to Bloomberg reporting republished on 2 November. The UAE alone faced more than 3,000 incoming drones and missiles, according to figures presented by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Gulf officials now argue that Iran would enter a second round better prepared and more willing to hit back hard. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has, according to weekend reports, ordered commanders to prepare for immediate counterstrikes and to expand their list of potential American and Israeli targets. Iran's army has warned that another attack would spread the war across a larger area. Those are threats, not confirmed battle plans, and they should be read as such — but Gulf planners cannot ignore them, because Iran has already shown it can reach the infrastructure that keeps Gulf societies running.

Three factors add to the risk: air defences and interceptor stocks have been depleted by months of fighting; the International Monetary Fund forecasts Gulf Arab states, including Iraq, will be among the world's worst-performing economies this year; and another wave of attacks would further erode investor and traveller confidence.

The Strait of Hormuz and the energy question

At the heart of Gulf anxiety is the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula through which a large share of the world's seaborne oil passes. Iran has disrupted shipping through the strait during this conflict, and Gulf officials fear a new campaign would bring sharper escalation there, with consequences for energy prices far beyond the Middle East.

Oil markets have already reacted to shifting signals. Brent crude fell around 3 percent in early trading on Monday, dropping below 110 dollars a barrel, after Axios reported that President Donald Trump had told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu he wanted to give diplomacy more time before potentially restarting strikes. Even after that fall, the benchmark remained up around 80 percent this year, a reminder of how much war risk is already priced into energy markets.

That volatility matters to readers far from the Gulf, because higher energy prices feed into transport costs, food prices and inflation in importing countries. Readers who want the background can read our earlier report on how the Hormuz crisis prompted a United Nations warning about global food supplies, which explains why a shipping chokepoint can become a food-security issue as well as an energy issue. A closure is not certain, but the strait gives Iran leverage that grows if fighting resumes.

Diplomacy is still moving, but slowly

Qatar is leading the most active mediation effort. According to NPR reporting from Bahrain on 2 November, Qatar has spent the past 72 hours in intense negotiations with Iran, trying to stave off another round of fighting. Iranian negotiators were reported to be in Qatar discussing proposals that could reopen the waterway and restart direct talks between the United States and Iran.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has confirmed that Iranian negotiators were in Qatar discussing such proposals, but Iran has said what comes next hinges on the American response to its latest offer. That is a familiar pattern in this crisis: talks are reported, but the gap between the two sides remains wide. Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials visiting Tehran last week gave Iran the same message: de-escalation and dialogue, not more war.

The difficulty is that diplomacy and military planning are running in parallel, sending opposite signals. While mediators talk about halting attacks on shipping and restarting negotiations, American and Israeli officials continue to discuss renewed strikes. That uncertainty is itself destabilising, because governments, businesses and ordinary people in the Gulf must prepare for both outcomes at once.

What Washington and Jerusalem are weighing

President Trump has repeatedly said the United States and Israel will finish the job in Iran, and that either Iran will make a deal or the United States will end it. At the same time, he has ruled out fresh strikes before Tuesday's United States midterm elections, while leaving open the possibility of renewed attacks if peace talks remain deadlocked. Axios reported that he told Netanyahu he wanted to give diplomacy more time before potentially restarting strikes.

That combination — a pause before the elections, an open threat after them — is the main reason Gulf officials are bracing for a decision in the days ahead. NPR's reporting from Bahrain put it plainly: after Tuesday's elections, Trump could decide to bomb Iran again. It is an option he has floated and one that has been discussed with Israel. But, importantly, he has not yet made a decision. The uncertainty is the story, not a confirmed plan.

Reports have suggested that a new phase, if it came, would be expected to target Iranian nuclear and missile facilities, power plants and other infrastructure. Those expectations are based on reporting about discussions, not on an announced operation, and no strike date or target list has been confirmed by Washington or Jerusalem. Readers should treat any claim of a fixed date or a detailed target list with caution unless it comes from an official announcement.

The IRGC question: what "regime change" really means

A development on 3 November adds an important nuance. CNN reported that President Trump says there has been regime change in Iran, but argued that two months into the war, it is in fact the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that has risen in influence. The distinction matters, because the IRGC is not a new government. It is the powerful military and security organisation that has long been central to the Iranian state.

This helps explain why Gulf officials are sceptical that another campaign would quickly resolve the problem. If the war has strengthened the very organisation that Gulf states and Western governments regard as the most hardline element in Iran, then further strikes could, in their view, entrench that organisation further rather than weaken it. That is an analysis, not a proven fact, and Tehran's internal balance of power is hard to verify from outside — but it is why claims of a quick outcome should be treated with care.

What is not known — and what to watch

It is worth being clear about the limits of current reporting. No official American or Israeli announcement has confirmed a new strike campaign, its date or its targets. No verified casualty figures for a future round exist, because that round has not happened. Claims about what a second round would look like are forecasts from officials and analysts, not records of events. Similarly, the exact terms of the Qatari mediation proposals have not been published in full, so the diplomatic track should be described as active but unproven.

This caution is not a reason to dismiss the warnings from Bahrain. When the governments that would bear the cost of escalation say publicly that they fear a wider war, that is news in itself. It signals a widening gap between Gulf capitals and Washington and Jerusalem over strategy, even where they agree on Iran's programmes.

Watch four markers: the American response to the Qatari proposals, the language from Washington and Jerusalem after Tuesday's vote, the behaviour of Iran and its allies, and the economic signal in oil prices and shipping insurance. Continued public Gulf opposition to strikes would itself suggest private persuasion has not closed the gap.

Why this matters beyond the Middle East

For readers outside the region, this is not an abstract debate. It touches energy prices, food prices, shipping and the stability of a region that supplies much of the world's oil and gas. It also touches how wars end. The first phase ended in a truce, not a settlement, and without a settlement covering nuclear, missile and shipping questions, that truce is fragile.

Pressure without a diplomatic exit tends to produce escalation, not resolution. Our earlier report on India's three-part peace plan to end another major war makes a similar point — a workable settlement usually needs more than one track and more than one mediator. Likewise, our earlier coverage of President Trump's criticism of Ukraine's president shows how quickly diplomacy can become entangled with domestic political argument.

Conclusion

Gulf states are not predicting a wider war as a certainty. They are warning that it is a plausible consequence of a policy they oppose, and urging a different course while there is still time to take it. Their warnings in Bahrain were measured, public and consistent across countries that do not always agree with each other. That consistency is what makes them significant.

The coming days will test whether diplomacy can bridge the gap between Washington and Tehran, or whether the post-election pause gives way to a new campaign. Until an official decision is announced, the honest summary is this: Gulf governments fear the worst, mediators are still working, and the decision that matters most has not yet been made.